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Religious Experience as a Model for Emotional Experience
in Theatre
David V. Mason
Introduction
In 2004 I attended a college production of a period play involving swords.1  In 
a climax building to the sigh of intermission, two characters took up arms against 
each other and, after a series of lunges, feints, and parries, one of them dealt a deadly 
thrust and the other followed with a quick stage death. Before the tension of the 
moment dissipated, however, the triumphant character bent to the stage corpse of 
his theatrical foe, placed a ﬁnger in the stage wound, and with a dramatic ﬂourish 
jammed the befouled ﬁnger into his own mouth. Immediately, a sound rose like 
a signal to the house lights and the obligatory ﬁfteen-minute break—a signal not 
from the stage but from a cluster of undergraduate students seated together close 
to the stage and center, who in perfect unison and stunning phonetic agreement 
said, “Eww!”
From the standpoint of any one of the historical understandings of theatrical 
mimesis, this “Eww!-Effect” is a problem. It is one thing to acknowledge that 
theatrical activity inevitably imitates things outside the space and time of the theatre. 
It is something of a different order to confront the evidence that theatrical activity 
can take on a real, living life of its own, effectively existing as an ontological reality 
in the experience of the audience. Perhaps a degree of verisimilitude in theatre 
sometimes fools our conscious thoughts into a state of mistake, but in this case, 
the stage grotesquerie did not even include fake blood.
Reasoning from this one case, a production’s naturalist aims, the psychological 
authenticity of its actors, and the realism of its set apparently have little to do with 
the Eww!-Effect. Whatever the degree of realistic illusion intended by a production, 
the trappings of the theatre experience, from paid-parking to poorly upholstered 
seats to velour curtains, impose on an audience an uninterrupted discourse of 
fabrication. Not only might we cringe at blood-sucking on a stage, but we might 
also weep at Astyanax’s death, grit our teeth at Stanley’s abuse of Stella, and 
laugh at Bottom’s disﬁgurement, as though all these things really happen while we 
watch. The philosophical term paradox of ﬁction denotes the problem of reacting to 
stories—as presented in novels, cinema, painting, etc.—as though to immediately 
real events. The theatrical variation on this paradox is that staged action can affect 
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us as though it is not pretense, even while it demonstrates its pretense. Cort Webb, 
our college classmate, is never dead and bleeding on stage, and while the presence 
of his familiar, not-character body makes the pretense explicit, while we know in a 
very conscious way that he’s neither dead nor bleeding, we nevertheless see Brad 
Bergeron eat his blood, which, momentarily, like, grosses us out.
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James includes the anecdote 
of one of the “keenest intellects” of his acquaintance, which reads, in part:
On the previous night I had had, after getting into bed at my 
rooms in College, a vivid tactile hallucination of being grasped 
by the arm, which made me get up and search the room for an 
intruder; but the sense of presence so called came on the next 
night. After I had got into bed and blown out the candle, I lay 
awake awhile thinking on the previous night’s experience, when 
suddenly I felt something come into the room and stay close to 
my bed. It remained only a minute or two. I did not recognize it 
by any ordinary sense, and yet there was a horribly unpleasant 
‘sensation’ connected with it.2
It is hard not to note certain compelling similarities between the experience of 
James’s acquaintance and the Eww!-Effect. In both cases the subjects suffer a 
physical experience or reaction, and in both cases that reaction is predicated on a 
stimulus which appears in all respects to be imaginary. That is, both experiences are 
of the type which art theory has considered paradoxical. As though throwing their 
arms in the air when confronted by a man with a banana, the subjects’ physical/
emotional response overlooks the actual physical stimulus in favor of seeing and 
reacting according to a constructed, or imagined, stimulus. The kinds of experiences 
aesthetics has dubbed paradox of ﬁction, religious studies seems to know only as 
religious experience.3
James points out the essential perplexity of religious experience. Because their 
nature is not communicated or validated through sense content, he notes, following 
Kant, terms like god, soul, and immortality have no real signiﬁcance. “Yet strangely 
enough,” writes James, “they have a deﬁnite meaning for our practice. We can 
act as if there were a God; feel as if we were free; consider Nature as if she were 
full of special designs; lay plans as if we were to be immortal.”4  In other words, 
the religious person acts (and reacts) as though things were much different than 
all the evidence suggests. In fact, a dogged disregard for the divide between the 
empirical world and the unveriﬁable seems to characterize religious experience. 
The experience of theatre can be much the same, as we act or react, like the 
undergraduates at The Illusion, not because of our senses, but in spite of them.
The same mechanism by which devotees experience spiritual realities may also 
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produce the Eww! moment in theatre audiences. In the following three sections 
I argue that theatre-experience may be much like religious-experience, and not 
merely analogically, but qualitatively. First, I examine current theory related 
to the paradox of ﬁction. Several theories on this subject emphasize the role of 
imagination, variously understood, as the mechanism that produces real feelings 
for unreal objects. Implied in the theories of Michael Weston, Murray Smith, and 
Kendall Walton is the signiﬁcance of socialization and conditioning in the operation 
of the imagination. Part two develops this implication through Hjalmar Sundén’s 
role-theory, which argues that religious experience is a psychological operation 
relying on an individual’s active identiﬁcation with behavioral models valorized 
by speciﬁc religious traditions. The religious individual, according to Sundén, 
acts a role that anticipates and generates a religious experience. Finally, I correlate 
Sundén’s theory of the religious individual who actively enters into a culturally 
determined role with the theatre-goer. The theatre-goer’s experience develops from 
his or her own active role-playing—a playing that, like religious activity, fulﬁlls 
its own anticipation.
The Paradox of Fiction
The philosophical argument about the paradox of ﬁction has swung in recent 
decades between an insistence on its inscrutability, the assertion that it’s all in our 
heads, and the contention that there is no paradox in the ﬁrst place. Colin Radford 
took up the paradox with fascination thirty years ago. “What is worrying,” he 
writes, “is that we are moved by the death of Mercutio and we weep while knowing 
that no one has really died, that no young man has been cut off in the ﬂower of 
his youth.”5  And while Radford is never content with any of the several possible 
solutions he considers, he does identify a few points signiﬁcant to the present 
discussion. Particularly relevant here is his contention that we cannot resolve 
the paradox by resorting to the argument of suspension-of-disbelief.6  We do not, 
Radford argues, ever not disbelieve. If we did suspend our disbelief, he reasons, 
we would be forced by the theatrical circumstances in which we, consequently, do 
believe to confront our own immediate relationship to the action. “Do we shout 
and try to get on the stage when . . . we see that Tybalt is going to kill Mercutio? 
We do not.”7  Our approach to a play and its content is always, and foremost, as 
an audience member at a play.8  Decades later, Radford concedes that the paradox 
continues to defy resolution. “[We] are irrational, inconsistent, and incoherent in 
being moved to pity for ﬁctional characters,” he concludes, “and we are nonetheless 
moved (of course).”9
The competing proposals attempting to resolve the paradox of ﬁction are 
consistently audience-centric. We seem to have satisﬁed ourselves that the work 
of ﬁction itself does not mandate an emotional response; or, if it does, that the 
paradox of an audience’s emotion in the face of its consciousness of a work’s 
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ﬁctionality does not arise. We also seem to accept that an author does not elicit by 
ﬁat an emotional response to or through her work. The audience’s own activity, the 
way it meets and engages with ﬁction, recurs as a fundamental piece of aesthetic 
theory dealing with the paradox.
In recent work addressing the paradox of ﬁction, theorists such as Murray 
Smith and Noël Carroll have attempted to account for the persistence of our 
unbelief by challenging the premise that emotion always requires belief. Instead, 
they propose separate mental mechanisms through which an audience member 
supplements ﬁction’s cognitive deﬁciency. Smith’s mechanism is a particular kind 
of imagination, while Carroll’s mechanism is a speciﬁc understanding of thought. 
Both theories indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, elevate the role the audience 
itself plays in developing the condition in which real emotion arises in response 
to an apparent ﬁction.
Noël Carroll’s approach to the paradox of ﬁction, for instance, hinges on thought, 
a mental faculty by which an audience elevates ﬁction to a cognitively legitimate 
status. In many cases, argues Carroll, thought is a sufﬁcient cognitive component to 
produce legitimate feeling, and what he calls “unasserted propositions”—thoughts 
about the truth of which we maintain neutrality—if entertained imaginatively inspire 
feeling as if true propositions:
You do not need to believe that you are going to put the knife 
into your eye. Indeed, you know you are not going to do this. 
Yet merely entertaining the thought, or the propositional content 
of the thought (that I am putting this knife into my eye), can be 
sufﬁcient for playing a role in causing a tremor of terror. For 
emotions may rest on thoughts and not merely upon beliefs.10 
By insisting on the “unasserted” nature of the thought of a knife in one’s eye, Carroll 
accounts for overt ﬁction that foments feeling while proposing a mechanism by 
which the ﬁction affects its audiences.11
Writing of the paradox as evident in audience reactions to cinema, Malcolm 
Turvey argues that the mental mechanism that Carroll postulates, upon which 
our emotional response to ﬁction rests, is unnecessary, even if it operates, as 
Carroll asserts, in certain circumstances. Turvey points out that if its principles are 
legitimate (and exclusively so), Carroll’s thought theory suggests that thought or 
imagination alone, divorced from any particular medium, should be sufﬁcient to 
inspire emotional reaction. If a mental mechanism mediates between an inadequate 
stimulus (such as the ﬁctional content of a movie) and emotion by supplying the 
cognitive foundation for real feeling, a person ought to have the same reaction 
whether he “views the hypothetical ﬁction ﬁlm or reads the shooting script upon 
which it is based.”12  Rather, says Turvey, the cinematic medium is sufﬁcient in 
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itself to affect us emotionally.
Following Turvey’s critique, in Beyond Aesthetics Carroll offers a very useful 
adjustment in the form of a connection between the activity of authors and audiences. 
To account for the increased emotional efﬁcacy of a ﬁnished ﬁlm, as opposed to the 
screenplay which expresses the same ﬁctional content, Carroll suggests that artistry 
directs and shapes the attention audiences give to the unasserted propositions or 
thoughts which arise from ﬁctional content. Additionally, and most importantly, 
Carroll reasons, an audience reciprocates. The authors of ﬁctions, Carroll tells us, 
offer us unasserted propositions which attract our attention, and then manipulate our 
attention through artistry so as to focus our anticipation as an emotional expectation, 
which we seek to sustain and satisfy in the work of ﬁction.13  Carroll sees that the 
kind of ﬁctional objects which inspire feelings must be of a special, augmented sort. 
Under the scrutiny which an author sculpts, ﬁctional objects, writes Carroll, “are 
lit, in a manner of speaking, in a special phenomenological glow . . . apposite to 
the emotional state we are in.”14  That is, Carroll suggests, we the audience invest 
ﬁctional objects with the peculiar characteristic that enables them reﬂexively to 
draw emotional responses from us.
This element of Carroll’s model is useful, identifying how an audience actively 
contributes to the way in which ﬁctions affect them. If the development of an 
emotional reaction depends in its early stages on the entertainment of unasserted 
propositions, Carroll’s theory seems to me a starting point for an examination of 
the audience member’s life prior to the performance, rather than during it.
Thought theory’s usefulness to discussions of emotional responses in more 
secular circumstances may be limited to understanding what we might call the 
“back story” of emotional responses to ﬁction. The “emotional state” of an audience 
member, upon which the “phenomenological glow” of Carroll’s theory depends is, 
most often, well developed before the audience member’s encounter with a ﬁctional 
work, and is very often founded upon both asserted and unasserted propositions 
the audience member has already come to regard as equally true. The audience 
member’s emotional state largely pre-exists her experience of a play, whether in 
the short term—say, an argument with a cab driver on the way to the theatre—or 
in the long term, such as the accumulated emotional and psychological weight of a 
life of poverty or ill-health, or the never-simple relationships of any never-typical 
family. The emotional content of those experiences for the audience member is 
largely shaped by both asserted and unasserted propositions the audience member 
has come to regard as equally true (or, at least, valid), including conventions of 
courtesy that govern driver-passenger interactions, economic theory, medical ethics, 
and religious doctrines that contextualize such things as family relationships. The 
audience member’s emotional state may itself be a product resulting paradoxically 
from entertaining unasserted propositions; in this case, attention to the way an 
individual’s emotional state phenomenologically lights a work of ﬁction is the 
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beginning of the discussion, rather than the end.
In a response to Colin Radford, Michael Weston denies that a real paradox 
exists in the paradox of ﬁction, yet he nevertheless must construct an explanation 
of the phenomenon—an explanation which relies on recognizing how signiﬁcant 
an audience member’s own context is to the emotional viability of a ﬁctional 
object. Citing social anthropologist Peter Winch, Weston notes that humans, as 
opposed to animals, not only live but have a “conception of life” which imbues 
things with particular values and develops meaningful associations between 
them. Consequently, Weston writes, “[the] importance of art to us is one way this 
concern to make sense of our lives appears. The possibility of our being moved 
by works of art must be made intelligible within the context of such a concern.”15 
Weston here offers Carroll’s theory an important supplement. Each author notes 
that ﬁctional objects develop emotional signiﬁcance depending upon the part they 
play in an individual audience member’s worldview, and, consequently, have a real 
emotional force to the same extent that the audience member’s own “conception 
of life” (or worldview) is “real.”  The unasserted thought “Manhattan is made of 
pizza” produces no emotional response because we cannot to any degree maintain 
neutrality about its truth content, and cannot ﬁnd a place for it in our worldview. 
However, “Astyanax is dead” can produce an emotional response in us; for, even 
though we remain non-neutral with respect to the truth of this speciﬁc thought, we 
nevertheless ﬁnd a place in our worldview in which is assigned a value to children, 
their relationships with their mothers, and their untimely deaths, and this mechanism 
of location injects the thought of Astyanax’s death with real emotional force. To 
some degree this is only factualism, at least insofar as the theory proceeds from a 
recognition of the basic truth that we do, generally, feel sad about dead children. 
But in his critique of thought theory, Weston articulates how our sociocultural 
environment provides the premise for the imaginative role-playing that others 
regard as essential to resolving the paradox.
Following Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, Richard Wollheim, et al., in 
developing a theory of “imagining ‘from the inside’,” Murray Smith offers an 
approach to the paradox of ﬁction that dwells more on an audience member’s 
activity during the encounter with the work of ﬁction.16  For Smith, whose preferred 
medium, like Carroll’s, is ﬁlm, a spectator’s emotional response to ﬁction comes 
from her capacity to imagine the experience of a character as presented by a work 
of ﬁction. Smith argues that, while watching a movie, audience members engage in 
a variety of simulative activities, imitating, in a way, what they can imagine is the 
emotional, affective, and autonomic experiences of the movie’s characters. In this 
way, they imaginatively enter the movie, and their own responses to the movie’s 
circumstances are the product of more or less successfully inhabiting in a make-
believe way one or another of the movie’s characters (or, even, many of them at 
once). In Smith’s terms, the undergraduate reaction in the case of the Eww!-Effect 
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described above results from their vivid imagination of what it must be like to be 
Clindor, sucking fresh blood off the end of his ﬁnger.
The immediate point is that the Eww!-Effect may arise not from the audience 
entering into the play, but from the play spilling off the stage into the laps of the 
audience. Our groaning undergraduates do not respond in accord with Clindor’s—
the character’s—experience, which is characterized by barbaric ferocity rather than 
by squeamishness, but in accord with their own real-life aversion to the experience 
of someone else’s fresh blood in their mouths.17 Which is to say that in the Eww! 
moment, they are not so much inside the play as the play is inside them. Smith 
partly accounts for this discrepancy by proposing different kinds of inside imagining. 
Acentral imagining, he asserts, involves “imagining the scenario ‘outside’ any 
[particular] character’s perspective.”18  As an example of acentral imagining, 
Smith directs our attention to a scene from the ﬁlm Homicide, in which we see a 
homicide investigator insult a murder victim and slur her ethnicity, unwittingly 
within earshot of the victim’s granddaughter. Smith argues that our visceral reaction 
to this scene arises not from imagining the experience of a character in it, but from 
a much broader, more omniscient perspective than any one character in the scene 
could have.
Smith contends that acentral imagining is, like central imagining, a kind of 
imagining “from the inside” of the world of ﬁction. But the omniscience necessary 
to acentral imagining prevents us from inhabiting the inside of the ﬁctional world, 
as much as it prevents us from inhabiting the experience of a particular character.19 
Like the uncomfortable seats and velour curtains in a theatre, an omniscient or 
multi-perspective view reminds us perpetually of our position as viewers, outside 
the events of the ﬁction, so that whatever reactions an audience has as omniscient 
viewers are necessarily rooted in their own world of the theatre house. The play, or 
the movie, or the novel seems to produce emotional and other kinds of reactions to 
its content by inﬁltrating the audience’s world, as much as the other way around.
Smith’s approach lays more explicit emphasis than Carroll’s on the active input 
of an audience. Like Carroll’s “phenomenological glow,” Smith’s conception of 
the mechanism of “imagining,” either centrally or acentrally, depends largely on 
the audience’s own “back story,” but focuses on the mental activity of the audience 
rather than on its emotional state. By promoting make-believe as the foundation 
of our paradoxical feelings for ﬁction, Kendall Walton takes an additional, crucial 
step, and one that unmistakably characterizes the audience experience as analogous 
(at least) to religious experience.
Walton draws our attention to the imaginative playing of children and asserts, 
“We appreciators [of ﬁction] also participate in games of make-believe.”20 The 
salient element of Walton’s theory is “personality,” which “activates psychological 
mechanisms” in the face of ﬁction so as to bring on “genuine distress.” Walton 
describes at some length a scenario in which a person goes caving: crouching, 
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crawling, and eventually wriggling deep into an ever-narrowing and lightless tunnel 
until the passageway is so attenuated as to prevent turning of any sort—and then 
the caver’s lamp fails. Following this story, Walton concludes, “My imagining of 
the spelunking expedition taps into my actual personality and character. This, I am 
sure, is why it affects me as it does. It is because of my (dispositional) claustrophobia 
that I ﬁnd it distressing to imagine slithering on my belly through the cramped 
passages of a cave.”21  An individual, continues Walton, awakes her dispositional 
nature through an active process of make-believe, or, more philosophically stated, 
through mental simulation. The claustrophobic anxiety paradoxically felt in the 
comfort of an easy chair on the back patio arises naturally, and in a real way (or, 
at least, a manner that is really felt) from the way her active, mental simulation of 
the caving scenario awakens, directs, and focuses her own inherent phobia of dark, 
oppressive spaces. The real feeling, such as it is, is not created by the scenario, 
but “is a standing (or dispositional) condition which I had all along and which is 
merely activated and revealed by my imaginative experience.”22
Walton’s caving story may evoke nightmares of Method exercises, if not of 
caves. Whether via the Method or otherwise, entering into such an imaginative 
experience is often a basic, readily recognized, activity of “acting” as conceived in 
the 20th-century West. I am not, however, seeking here a recapitulation of acting, per 
se. Rather, I am reaching for an understanding of audiencing, especially to suggest 
that there might not be a reason to distinguish too clearly between the two. The 
feeling audience member, if we follow Walton, et al., does not passively absorb 
the content of the ﬁction—content which then works inside the audience member 
to produce feeling—but, to the extent that her real-world experience allows, opens 
herself to the world of the ﬁction, assuming, in an active way not unlike an actor, 
a role that corresponds with and facilitates the course of the ﬁction.
Role-Theory of Religious Experience
Religious experience is a phenomenon similarly dependent on a particular 
cultural worldview and the degree to which an individual plays within that 
worldview. Because of the way in which religious experience may be said to arise 
from the manner in which individuals order and value what they encounter, often 
with open disregard for their apparent, physical circumstances, religious experience 
provides a very useful model for the kind of theatrical experience in which emotional 
response to ﬁction arises. Proceeding from William James’s premise that religious 
experience is fundamentally irrational, we can identify a similar paradox in theatrical 
experience: whereas with ﬁction we wonder how we can feel while recognizing 
pretense, we might wonder, at least from the point of view of an empirical theory 
of knowledge, how religious experience is at all possible.
One way of approaching the paradox of religious experience is role-theory, 
a psychological theory developed by Hjalmar Sundén, once a professor of the 
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Psychology of Religion at Uppsala University in Sweden. Role-theory understands 
religious experience as a combination of social and environmental forces with 
an individual’s own propensity for role playing. The theory which Sundén 
developed beginning in the late 1950s is not only theatrical in its own terminology 
and conception, but provides a way of productively reconsidering what theatre 
audiences undergo. Refocused on theatrical experience itself, Sundén’s theory offers 
a compelling approach to the paradox of ﬁction by describing in psychological 
terms the way in which audience members actively contribute to their experience 
of art.
Sundén’s theory, in the ﬁrst place, rests on the same premise as Weston’s 
argument concerning the paradox of ﬁction, which is that individuals inevitably 
seek out ways of making sense of their lives. Weston postulates that this search 
for sense or meaning accounts for our emotional experience of ﬁction. Similarly, 
Sundén suggests that an individual’s search for meaning accounts for his or her 
religious experience, and he conceives a speciﬁc psychological mechanism by 
which the individual proceeds from search to experience.
According to Sundén’s role theory, individuals attain to religious experiences 
by way of preparation and participation. Myths—broadly understood as history, 
legend, scripture, theology, philosophy, and so forth—repeated in the context of 
religious life provide models and patterns of meaning that individuals may adopt 
for themselves by identifying with the roles in the myths. As a consequence of 
this role-playing, individuals prime themselves to experience what their mythical 
prototypes experience. “If one has therefore learned the narrative [myth] in 
question,” writes Nils Holm, “one is in possession of a set for speciﬁc religious 
experience. One then carries a latent psychological propensity to experience the 
world in a religious manner.” The myth, then, provides a meaning-generating 
structure for an individual’s experience of life. “If, from the individual’s own 
perspective,” continues Holm, “there is a similarity between his own situation and a 
particular narrative in the holy tradition, the myth, a restructuring phenomenon can 
occur in that person, so that the mythological reality also becomes reality for the 
individual in question.”23  Given effective stimuli—present circumstances which 
seem to correspond with the circumstances of mythic paradigms—the individual 
who has incorporated those paradigms into his or her worldview responds in the 
character of an appropriate model, conﬂating his or her immediate experience with 
the experience of the mythic role, such that the individual and the role blend.
The effect of the process Sundén proposes is that the individual upon whom 
such a pattern works comes to order his or her perception of reality in a particular 
way, and not, necessarily, in accord with an empirical view. What is ‘real’ to the 
religious individual is that which corresponds to and reinforces the mythic models, 
as well as the individual’s correspondence to the models. At some length, Sundén 
offers the example of Max Dauthendey, a German national interned by the Dutch on 
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Java at the start of World War I, in whose Bible was found the following note:
Tosari—Saturday June 30, 1917. In the morning this day when I 
read the Psalms of David numbers 50 and 60 and insight ﬂashed 
upon me. I understood that there is a personal God. Three weeks 
before my ﬁftieth anniversary I got this revelation. —What a 
splendid certitude about the goal entered today into my heart, 
into my spirit, into my body. —God lives, He is a person, and 
everything lives through Him.24
With reference to Dauthendey’s journal, Sundén proceeds to interpret the experience 
in the following way:
From his diary we learn that Dauthendey was very anxious about 
his native country, which on June 30th, 1917 had been engaged 
in a great war for three years. When he came to Psalm 60, which 
in the Luther-Bible has the heading Gebet in Kriegszeiten (or 
“prayer in times of war”), he found words that he could easily 
make his own. Doing so, the reading may have changed into a 
real prayer . . . . Dauthendey had in fact been in real trouble. He 
could therefore experience God’s “I will come to your rescue” 
statement as addressed especially to him, and the words he found 
in Psalm 60 made it easy for him to take the role of the praying 
man who approached God in this way. What then happened 
seems to be that God . . . suddenly enters his perceptual ﬁeld as 
a personal presence that gives it new structure.25
Dauthendey, then, serves as an example of the way an individual, through his 
perception of a similarity of circumstances (war), identiﬁes himself with a sanctiﬁed 
model (the Psalmist), and restructures his worldview so as to accommodate the 
correspondence between himself and the mythic model. The Psalmist experienced 
a revelation of God, and Dauthendey, by entering into the role of the Psalmist, 
does, too.
We must note, however, that Dauthendey does not come to think of himself as 
the Psalmist. His perceptual ﬁeld does not change in such a way that he loses his 
sense of distance between himself and the writer of the Psalms. For Dauthendey, 
the Psalmist is still dead, his written words still on the page (even if sacred), the 
Biblical moment still an event removed by history from Dauthendey’s immediate 
circumstances. Dauthendey’s experience, then, coexists with a clear and conscious 
awareness that he has not entered into the Psalmist’s relationship with God in any 
literal way; rather, the experience he has through an association with the Psalmist 
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is distinctly his own.
The individual’s anticipation of a particular experience associated with 
an adopted role tunes the individual to ﬁnd that experience in his or her own 
circumstances. This kind of anticipation fulﬁllment operates in secular as well as 
spiritual ways. Holm summarizes a decidedly secular example, frequently cited 
by Sundén:
In Northern Sweden the criminal police received knowledge of 
a criminal league from Finland which was wreaking havoc on 
the Swedish coast. A search party set out. It was discovered that 
a wrecked cottage had been broken into and that the thieves had 
stolen a couple of riﬂes, together with ammunition. A rowing 
boat had also disappeared. The latter was discovered on an island. 
Therefore the thieves were also probably present on the island. 
The search party disembarked and moved forward over the open 
countryside. Suddenly the commander leapt behind a rock for 
shelter. He had seen a man pointing a gun at him. He waited for 
the whistle of bullets, but nothing happened. Finally, he got up 
and searched carefully over the terrain. He found a beer-bottle 
lying on the ground, with the neck pointed toward him, and 
this shape corresponded to an element in the preparedness that 
the commander had built up: the gun barrel which he had been 
expecting to see.26
Here, the commander’s training as a police ofﬁcer, his experience in the profession, 
the circumstances of this case, cooperated to fuel a speciﬁc anticipation that 
his immediate environment easily fulﬁlled. And we ﬁnd in this particular case 
something not unlike the Eww!-Effect, as the commander reacted to a beer bottle 
as though it had been a riﬂe.
Of course, this commander’s substantive fear for his own, real life, such as 
theatrical audience members never experience, contributed in a signiﬁcant way to a 
misperception that borders on delusion; nor was the commander here simultaneously 
faced with explicit frames of fabrication, such as theatrical audiences generally 
face. This example only draws our attention to the important role that anticipation 
plays in Sundén’s theory. If applied to theatre and audiences simply to say that, by 
entering roles which correspond with stage characters, audience members anticipate 
stage action in such a way that ﬁnding some means of fulﬁlling those expectations 
is almost inevitable, role theory does not contribute to the discussion of the paradox 
of ﬁction beyond the conventional understanding of “suspension of disbelief.”
But by further distinguishing between “role-taking” and “role-adopting,” 
Sundén suggests that audiences do something more functional than merely 
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“suspend disbelief,” something that better accounts for audience experiences that 
often exceed the possibilities of Coleridge’s phrase. For Sundén, not only does 
the religious individual take the role of a counterpart in myth (thus anticipating 
the role’s experience), but the same individual also adopts the role of God, which 
is to say that the individual incorporates the perspective of that ﬁgure to which is 
attributed the power to fulﬁll the expectations of the mythic role. This understanding 
of the dual aspects of roles develops from the interactionist model of sociology and 
psychology which reasons that identity is partly constructed through an individual’s 
understanding of how others perceive him or her. According to this model, an 
individual role-plays especially as a mechanism of self-examination. “Through 
role-play, the child for example is able to enter into the experience of how others 
perceive it,” Holm explains. “The child can be both child and mother in one and the 
same game. By means of such games, the child learns to internalize other people’s 
evaluations of itself. The child, in other words, acquires its conscious knowledge of 
generalized others.”27  What this means for Sundén’s theory is that dual perceptions 
characterize religious experience:
[The] individual takes the role of the human party in a mythical 
role play, and simultaneously adopts God’s role, which 
unconsciously structures perception so that what happens around 
the individual is actually experienced as the action of God. For a 
brief instant, the person can quite concretely experience the action 
of God. A phase shift has taken place, and the individual ﬁeld of 
perception has become structured by a mythical role.28
In this way, the individual’s perception of the ontological reality of God is partly a 
consequence of inhabiting God’s point-of-view with respect to the mythic model 
at the same time as inhabiting the mythic model itself, which the individual has 
identiﬁed with his or her situation. Wikström describes the process in this way:
[When] someone takes the role of a human in a text, he adopts 
or anticipates the role of ‘the Other.’ He will expect that God 
will act towards him in his actual situation in the same manner 
as God acted towards the ﬁgure he identiﬁed with in the text. 
. . . When the religious frame of reference is active, there is a 
readiness to perceive reality in an alternative way.29
Not only does the police commander take the role of “target” while searching the 
countryside, but he adopts the role of “sniper,” a point of view which restructures 
his perception. Not only does Dauthendey take the role of the Psalmist, he also 
adopts the role of God in response to his own dire circumstances and pleas, and in 
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doing so reconﬁgures his reality.
The Role-Playing Audience
When applied to the paradox of ﬁction as manifest in theatre, role theory may 
suggest that what is explicit in religious practice may be unavoidably implicit in 
theatre traditions. We can read dramatic literature as scripturally paradigmatic, 
and ﬁctional characters—dramatic characters—as enjoying an ontological status 
similar to the roles of Sundén’s theory. In the same way that an individual facing 
a difﬁcult surgery can experience the comforting presence of God by identifying 
with the biblical Isaac, a theatre-goer can experience the displeasure of tasting 
blood by identifying with the Calderonian Clindor. An audience member takes and 
adopts roles relevant to stage action in a way that is similar to the way subjects of 
religious experience take and adopt paradigmatic and divine roles.
That is not to say that theatre-goers “believe” in theatrical characters in the way 
religious believers believe in the ﬁgures of scripture. Certainly, for the believer, 
the biblical Abraham is more real than Mercutio. But historical reality is not the 
issue here, since, historically real or not, the ﬁgures of scriptural texts are not 
present. The act of reading the Bible itself does not bring Abraham to immediate 
and tangible life in the presence of the reader, regardless of his or her position 
with regard to Abraham’s historicity. For the reader, Abraham is absent, removed 
from perception, and only appears to the devotee in (theatrical) representation. As 
Sundén conceives it, a religious experience that arises from reading Genesis is not 
an experience of Abraham’s historical reality, but an experience of God through 
the narrative model of Abraham’s experience of God, as available solely through 
the text and the cultural tradition of the text. Consequently, since none of them 
is any more present than another in the reader’s or the spectator’s experience, 
Abraham and Mercutio (and Krishna and Blanche) appear to us similarly, and we 
can interpret each as a facilitator of Sundén’s theoretical process. When we do, 
we see that the audience may similarly identify with Mercutio and his dramatic 
circumstances so as to associate those circumstances with the audience member’s 
own circumstances.
Taking Mercutio’s role, the audience member enters into a condition of 
anticipation, expecting the pattern to come to a conclusion and associating the 
pattern with his or her own circumstances in such a way as to develop meaning 
both for the stage action and for his or her personal situation. Simultaneously, the 
audience member adopts a role which the pattern suggests stands in a transcendent 
position enabling it to fulﬁll the pattern’s expectations. Given the audience member’s 
consciousness of the fabrication of the dramatic circumstances, this role inevitably 
emerges as the forces of the playhouse itself, embodied in the playwright, the 
director, the actors—those involved in the artistry of the production—so that 
the audience member’s emotional experience arises, as does Sundén’s religious 
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experience, from the audience member’s dual identity as a subject of circumstances 
(a Mercutio type) and as a creator of circumstances (an artist). By integrating the 
model with a sense of power over the model, the audience member uniﬁes the 
ﬁctional world and his or her empirical world so as to undergo a “phase shift” 
in which “the individual ﬁeld of perception has become structured by a mythical 
role.”30  At this point, the reality of the play and the reality of the theatre are blended. 
Insofar as the audience member believes his or her own living circumstances to be 
real, when those circumstances mingle with the circumstances of the play, there 
is, in fact, a cognitive basis for the audience member’s tearful experience, just as 
religious experience develops from the blending of empirical and spiritual realities.31 
Art and spirituality occupy similar positions in both types of experience, as the 
individual subject actively constructs (even if only on a temporary basis) a legitimate 
understanding of what is happening in his or her ﬁeld of perception.
Sundén’s role theory gives us a sense of how actively an audience contributes 
to a theatrical production. The individual comes to religious experience as the object 
of cultural conditioning, to be sure, but ultimately only as a consequence of his or 
her propensity for playing with—and in—that conditioning. Certain activities, such 
as scripture reading, prayer, and ritual, explicitly assist the individual’s play and 
provide reﬂexive reinforcement for the individual’s sense of a role’s legitimacy, 
so as to facilitate the phase shift by which the individual, as the protagonist, plays 
out a mythic pattern. Theatre (usually) does not offer such explicit assistance to 
audience members. But theatre audiences similarly approach productions from a 
position of cultural conditioning (to which theatre itself contributes), and, in their 
uncomfortable seats beneath the exit signs, enter into play which combines both 
the world inside the production and the world of the theatre. In this way, theatrical 
experience is religious experience. Both seem to defy reason, and both develop 
through the same mechanism, which is the audience’s creative activity. Emotional 
experience of theatre, the kind which seems to be at odds with a production’s 
explicit fabrication, is, thus, less the consequence of the production itself—its 
realism, style, expression, the peculiar power of its artistry—than it is the result 
of the production’s harmony with an individual audience member’s worldview and 
that individual’s peculiar propensity for play.
Generally speaking, Western theories of dramatic performance, at least of the 
last century, expect that the actor generates (by skill, training, talent, inspiration, or 
whatever means are at his or her disposal) the world of the play, and dynamically 
draws the audience into that world.32   The degree to which Olivier is Hamlet is a 
function of the deportment of Olivier. The Stanislavski System developed precisely 
to equip actors to assume this responsibility. And not only do the so-called realistic 
forms of Western theatre rely on the actor as their means of cogency. Artaud, Brecht, 
Grotowski, Bogart, et al., all put actors at the center of their theories of performance. 
The degree to which Weigel’s scream directs our attention to the crime of human 
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inconstancy should be understood as a function of Weigel’s own peculiar talent. 
The dependency of theatrical performance on actors is not unreasonable. Since the 
actor is the medium by which dramatic narrative generally occurs, she therefore 
seems the natural instrument to vivify that narrative.
However, like the Stanislavskian actor who builds a character on a foundation 
of her own experience and feeling, the audience member also arrives at an emotional 
experience of a play by way of her own experience and feeling. Like a religious 
devotee, the feeling theatre-goer, when she intuits a space on stage in which she 
ﬁts, actively constructs a relationship to the characters and the action of the play 
that can itself fulﬁll intentions (the play’s and her own). Her experience follows 
as the consequence of a kind of devotion: the culmination of a pattern beginning 
before the curtain rises—indeed, before the patron arrives at the theatre—a pattern 
learned, practiced, and exercised over time, and reinforced by the similarly lived 
patterns of patrons around her. Feeling, then, for staged ﬁction in the face of the 
multitudinous frames that indicate ﬁction, demonstrates just how actively an 
audience member works during a performance. As much as the actors themselves, 
the feeling audience member plays a part in the production and contributes as a 
player to the production’s effect.
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